I have finished reviewing the report and executive summary; this memo summarizes my comments. My overall reaction is that this is an excellent report—a careful, thorough assessment of the World Commission on Dams and its larger significance. It is also quite readable, well written, and well organized. As the report indicates, it will be several years before the WCD’s full, lasting significance becomes apparent. Yet the serious discussion of whether and to what extent it constitutes a "model" has already begun. This report will likely be the benchmark reference document in that debate. I provide several suggestions below for improvement or clarification; most of these could be handled with a light edit or a few short additions. My bottom-line recommendation is certainly to go forward aggressively.

First I provide some general comments that cut across the chapters, then chapter-specific comments, and then comments on the executive summary (which I understand to be a stand-alone document). I also note a few places where I interpret things a bit differently, based on my own subjective understanding, for what it’s worth.

1. The summary of WCD’s final report findings is both too late in the document and too cursory. There needs to be a short discussion of what the report says, substantively—e.g. its finding of 40-80 million displaced. I would consider putting in a summary paragraph early in chapter one, referencing perhaps a page-length box sketching the substantive findings. I understand why the choice was made to leave the assessment of the report until a late chapter (8) and that’s fine, but reader needs an executive summary early of what the report actually says or the "process" chapters will be harder to follow. Also, what you have in chapter 8 talks almost exclusively about the rhetorical aspects—values and strategic priorities it endorsed--as opposed to what it actually said about dams.

2. The authors rightly focus on the question of implementation and stakeholder "buy in", particularly among Southern governments. However, this is not the only pathway by which norms matter. It would be useful to add a short clear discussion, perhaps in the conclusion, of what constraints actors will face in the future, regardless of whether they buy in or not—what will it be harder to do, necessary to do, etc., as a result of the WCD precedent? Not everyone bought into the Brundtland Report and the concept of sustainability, yet it changed the terrain irrevocably. Are there any analogous effects lurking here, and if so, what might they be, both substantively and procedurally?

3. Somewhere, there should be a discussion of the larger context of the changing economics of dams. This is a crucial factor in explaining what forced everybody to the table. Social movements did raise costs of hydropower and make the World Bank respond--but they did so with great effect in no small measure because they raised costs at a time also marked by growing competition for natural gas turbines, declining public-sector funding for large water-infrastructure projects, enormous pressures to attract private-sector partners, etc etc. This is a key part of the story. Some of this is discussed in the technical papers that accompanied the 1997 Gland Workshop (and which were published in the World Bank/IUCN report on that event), and could be synopsized quickly.

CHAPTER 1

p. 1: I’d be cautious with word "celebrated" in first sentence

p. 2: awkward/long sentence first full paragraph

p. 4 bottom—stress (as you do elsewhere) that you are documenting INITIAL reactions

p. 5 describe workplan briefly when allude to its vastness

CHAPTER 2

I found pp. 7-8 a bit fuzzy and lacking in an organizing framework. It seems to me that such a framework would need to make two points: first, that the WCD in an important sense can be understood as sitting at the INTERSECTION of TWO trends in global governance—civil society mobilization and global commissions (each of which is well discussed later in the chapter). Second, when discussing the emergence of transnational civil-society advocacy, I was looking for some reference to the reasons why this is happening. In the literature the standard motive forces are usually described as some combination of (1) ‘democratization’ (however tenuous) has created political space in many countries; (2) the communications revolution has lowered transaction costs of networking; (3) globalization has increased the demand for such networking.

p. 8 toward bottom, I think you mean 4 decades, not "half-decade"...?

It makes no sense to me to include the Trilateral Commission in your set of global governance commissions. If you must include such closed-club, elite coordination activities, Davos would be a better example—but they really aren’t analogous to the entities that constitute the trend you describe (Brundtland, Brandt, etc.). Also, I would add some discussion of the Palme Commission which is mentioned only briefly in passing.

p. 13: Discussion of South Commission Report should acknowledge that they didn’t ONLY put the blame on the North. There is quite a bit of tough language in that report about how South needs to put its own house in order, fund its own development, etc. Much of the tone is "don’t rely solely on the North because they won’t help", as opposed to the way you characterize it.

p. 13: Discussion of UNCED seemed somewhat one-sided. You cite Chatterjee and Finger (note 44) but ought to acknowledge in passing some of the criticisms.

p. 16 The Basel Convention is probably a better example than the Montreal Protocol for your purposes. An excellent account of the role of NGOs in alliance with African states can be found in Jennifer Clapp, Jennifer Clapp, "Africa, NGOs, and the International Toxic Waste Trade", Journal of Environment and Development 3,2 (Summer 1994):17-46 and her subsequent book on toxics governance.

p. 17: Emergence of transnational social movements—I would say "what some have described as" TSMs, because there is a raging debate among social-movement scholars as to whether what we are seeing is continuous enough and densely grounded enough to be called social movements, as opposed to the looser, more episodic phenomenon of advocacy networks that Keck & Sikkink and others have documented.

pp. 19-20: Again, I’d return to the idea that WCD sits historically at the CONVERGENCE of the 2 trends—global commissions and transnat. civil society.

p. 23 Regarding note 52, you might also take a look at Paul Nelson’s very good book about the World Bank.

CHAPTER 3

Nice discussion of mounting social controversies at start of chapter. I was looking for a bit of this in chapter 1.

p. 29: "asserted without justification"--what does this mean—that IRN didn’t justify its assertion or that Bank failed to justify its conclusion?

p. 30: I would say what made IRN’s critique influential. Criticisms like theirs are very common and often fail to punch through—why did this one? Answer presumably lies in IRN’s network ties, careful content of its critique which couldn’t easily be dismissed, context of mounting pressure on Bank, etc.

p. 30: I would note that whereas Manibeli Declareation was focused solely on the World Bank, Curitiba Declaration is much broader in target. This is relevant in that it shows the movement broadening and gaining strength as a global voice.

p. 34: Somewhere around here it would be nice to have a short discussion of WHY each side came to the table (Bank, private sector actors, grassroots protesters, etc). You have it in passing in the conclusion (p. 37 top).

p. 35: In the gender discussion, I would use the Dublin principles (discussed later in your report) to underscore why gender considerations matter. As you know, the Dublin principles have become standard reference points and one of the four of them stresses gender dynamics around water centrally and explicitly.

CHAPTER 4

Box 4.2 should include the Chinese Commissioner who resigned, especially since you don’t discuss her resignation until later.

p. 48 "it is not immediately obvious"—sure it is. Given the vastness of the task the Commission set for itself, how could it have been otherwise?

CHAPTER 5

p. 61/intro—Again, I would caution you against associating the WCD’s significance SOLELY with stakeholder buy-in and state implementation. This is an important, perhaps central dimension, but not the only pathway by which norms matter. If it is harder for relevant stakeholders (e.g. IRN or ICOLD or whomeber) to leave or reject the process next time around, then that is an important effect even if they haven’t "bought in" as you phrase it.

pp. 63-4: You could indicate which of the dam cases were favored by the critics and which by the proponents, as a way of showing that all were satisfied that some of their favored cases were included.

p. 65 bottom: Good point, but why "curiously"?

p. 66 top: WCD’s judgment "was supported by later events." Worded this way, it sounds like a strong value judgment on your part. I’d simply describe the implications of that choice and likely implications of choice to include current stuff too.

p. 69 last word should be ‘irrelevant’, not ‘relevant’.

p. 78 To say that WCD efforts to democratize knowledge "foundered" seems too strong to me. They set an important precedent in trying, and they broadened the base of what kind of knowledge is considered relevant. I would reconsider the choice of words.

CHAPTER 6

I think you may give too much credit to the World Water Vision with Box 6.2 You imply that it is in some ways a parallel process, when in fact it’s much more top-down--reminiscent of say Agenda 21 more than WCD. The NGO forums in the Hague had little or no impact on the final Vision report—both the official and ‘alternate’ NGO statements that emerged were unconnected to the activities of most of the NGOs who showed up there.

Box 6.4—use of word "progressive" perhaps ill-advised. Would seem to be a problem no matter who is steering the dialogue, and hopefully this one wasn’t steered solely by "progressives" anyway.

p. 97—Around here it might be interesting to transcribe an illustrative exchange, showing what kinds of questions the comissioners tended to ask. Also, I wonder whether consultation is the right word—sounds more like taking testimony than really consulting.

CHAPTER 7

I felt the emphasis on interpersonal dynamics among the commissioners was a bit overdone. Interview-based processes tend to overplay this variable, as a general rule, so I would be careful about making so much of it. It matters, but perhaps could be treated in a bit more condensed fashion, with fewer assertions about remarkable climates of mutual respect etc.

p. 109 top: Had the Chinese minister remained on the commission, perhaps the criticisms would have been "lessened or forestalled"—but it’s also inconceivable to me that the same report would’ve been produced as a consensus document, so the point seems moot at best.

pp. 111-112 The discussion of the pros and cons of pressing for final closure vs. more extended consultation seems muddled. First you say they had good reason (p. 111) but then say the risk of additional consultation would’ve been worth taking.

CHAPTER 8

The point about harnessing the commission’s results to UN soft law is interesting, but in my judgment you flirt with making too much of it given the softness of that body of international law.

Again, as above, the summary of what the report says about dams is quite thin. Need some discussion of what they said about numbers of displaced peoples, greenhouse gases, reparations/compensation, etc, etc

pp. 130-131: I found the paragraph that begins "Southern governments generally praised..." to be problematic. To say they misinterpreted WCD’s stated intent is unfair—even if that was not the stated intent, clearly the political pressures on Southern governments trended in that direction, and several Commissioners and Forum members would’ve been pleased to see that as the frame for the final report and larger WCD process, so the reaction is predictable and understandable. Also, use of "they" seems far too aggregate—I would identify which governments you are talking about, rather than invoking generic "southern officials" and "Southern governments". (p. 131). Combined with the discussion at the top of p. 133 it reads more like a rebuttal than a factual ion o their reactions.

CHAPTER 9: Statement at top—did not significantly evolve debate—seems too strong in light of everything you’ve said in earlier chapters.

I was looking for a bit of broader discussion in this chapter. You emphasize whether states will buy in and implement more so than whether other important actors will do so; and you don’t really discuss what kinds of arguments or processes have been empowered by the WCD precedent. What will it be easier or harder to do as a result of this, both within and beyond the dams domain specifically?

p. 147: Good point about difference between aspirational text and least common denominator. A relevant example of the latter might be the water chapter in Agenda 21.

Some of the material in Appendix 5 on media is worth alluding to more strongly in the body of the text.

Appendix Figure 6.2 is unfathomable.

Throughout, one finds a few of the same language issues I raise above, because same language is used (e.g. NBA as "celebrated").

-The material on p. 2 does a better job than the larger report of summarizing the WCD as a product of convergent trends on global governance, perhaps because it’s shorter and therefore clearer.

-When discussing why the dams issue was "ripe" for this approach, I would add a reference to the extreme contentiousness and violence surrounding dam protests, relocations, etc.

-p. 4 ICID isn’t really a "dams" organization per se.

-Again, before launching into "findings and recommendations" I think you need a short sketch of the WCD’s substantive findings. Cursory sketch on p. 14 is too little, too late.

p. 7 Is "weak" the right adjective? Perhaps "cool".

Both here and in the report, I would be hesitant to say "lessons" (e.g. box on p. 8). Perhaps "strategies" suggested by the WCD experience is more accurate than "lessons".

p. 16: When sketching reactions I’d say "several", "many", "a wide range", etc., rather than making universalizing claims about the views of a stakeholder group such as NGOs or private firms or Southern governments.

Among the list of outreach opportunities for this report, I would add Rio-plus-10. One theme of that event is likely to be the need to move beyond interstate diplomacy as a mechanism of global governance, making the WCD experience/model central to the debate.