Overarching:

Reviewers wanted a more explicit description of the research framework we used, along with more references to that framework throughout the document. We strengthened the articulation of the research framework in the introduction, at the beginning and end of each chapter, and in the final conclusion.

Reviewers, especially those informal reviewers from the former Secretariat and Commission, wanted to see a fuller treatment of the practical trade-offs they had faced in their work. We added material to the chapters and to our recommendations to highlight what we thought could be done better in future processes, and what are inescapable trade-offs. We also expanded the language about political trade-offs faced by the WCD—to acknowledge that it was almost impossible to convene all stakeholders at the same table and sustain their interaction over time.

We revised the research framework to make more explicit what our standards of assessment were, and the criteria and approach we would use to reach conclusions. In addition, we strengthened our description of the methods we used.

We included a substantial box in the Introduction reporting on the WCD findings, in response to comments that the reader was given no flavour of the WCD’s own report until late in the book.

We added material in line with reviewers’ comments on:

• the Commissions on Forests, Oceans and Water;
• criticisms of the Earth Summit process;
• the need to focus the strands of analysis that run through the chapter.

We modified our writing in line with reviewers’ comments on:

• the characterisation of the South Commission;
• the detailed section on multilateral banks and civil society processes;
• the history and process of advocacy networks;
• the ways in which multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs) are expected to contribute to processes of global governance;
• the different roles that MSPs can play vis a vis formal policy-making processes.

We chose not to address in detail comments on the past track record of MSPs at the national level and their influence on the WCD. We had only limited access to materials about MSPs in Canada from one reviewer, who was also key to shaping the WCD. We felt that without the time to research and understand how the knowledge of processes at the national level in other countries, which other key actors in the WCD may have brought, it would be incomplete to focus on just one national experience.

We modified the chapter in line with reviewers’comments on:

• the characterisation of limited government involvement in the early days of the WCD;
• the relative balance between presentation of the OED report, and criticisms of it;
• a need for greater emphasis on the reputational pull of the World Bank and IUCN as convenors;
• the need for more explicit discussion of industry perspectives and involvement in the pre-WCD days;
• the broadening of the dams critique from the Manibeli to the Curitiba declarations;
• the need to steer clear of language on "stalemate" as an inappropriate characterisation of the dams debate before the Gland meeting, since NGOs, in particular, had not considered the debate to be mired in a stalemate at that stage, rather, certain industry actors found projects bogged in stalemate.

We modified our discussion of Commissioner selection processes to reflect reviewers’ assertions that it was secretive and fuzzy, and that, for some stakeholders, accessibility to the selection process was only won after some struggle.

We nuanced our language about the participation of women in the various bodies of the Commission to recognise that such processes need not only the vigorous and meaningful participation of women, but also the participation of gender advocates and specialists, generally. We added reference to the 1992 Dublin Principles as a comparator for the kind of norms of gendered participation in water resources development that have emerged in recent years.

We chose not to address:

• the importance of the pre-WCD Gland meeting as an important example of an MSP in itself. The Gland meeting was prior to the beginning of our research and we did not have sufficient information on the details of the meeting. We did note the significance of the start-up process, but given time and length restrictions, we chose not to make the Gland meeting a central focus;
• a suggestion for greater focus on the Commissioner nomination process. Although we have information on this process, we felt it would burden the report with an unnecessary amount of detail for the target audience;
• a suggestion that we explore the implications of an increase in the number of Commissioners from that which was planned. We did not have sufficient information to address this request;
• the shifting economics of the dams debate. Although we added a reference, detailed treatment of this issue was beyond the scope of the report.

In line with reviewer comments, we addressed:

- some internal inconsistencies in our report about the asserted breadth of experience on the WCD Secretariat;

• government and industry perspectives that the Secretariat lacked technical skill;
• the perception and concern among industry groups of a strong IUCN role on the WCD’s Secretariat;
• the distinction between a review of development effectiveness and a work programme that was also intended to solicit stakeholder perspectives on good process. A reviewer commented that industry groups failed to appreciate the latter role of the work programme;
• updating the figures and charts of WCD revenue sources to reflect updated information;
• the manner in which "eminence" was balanced against "representation" in selection of Commissioners;
• our discussion of the relevance or value of having the World Bank represented on the Commission. Reviewers correctly noted that during the WCD, discussion of a Bank Commissioner did not arise. We chose to include discussion of such a possibility because it is relevant for future processes, judging from past processes where the Bank has maintained greater control. We modified our discussion to note that inclusion of a Bank Commissioner would have compromised the independence of the WCD;
• in line with new information obtained from the World Bank, we discussed more explicitly the reasons for Commissioner Shen Guoyi’s withdrawal from the Commission;
• we included more explicit discussion of the various lenses through which representation could be viewed, including country and regional representation. We also noted the limits of a "trisectoral" framing of stakeholder interests.

• In line with reviewer comments, we added language about the Indian government’s dissatisfaction with the data collection process. There were few other, detailed comments from reviewers about this chapter, except from the former WCD Secretariat. Based upon Secretariat information, we modified the description of the Brazil case study and corrected several other factual errors and areas where our portrayals had been perceived as biased toward one side or another (eg, providing only the dam-affected people’s movement side of the Brazil story).
• In addition to addressing reviewer comments, we redistributed some of the material between Chapters 4 and 5. For instance, we moved the material from Chapter 4 about alternate scenarios for the work programme to the beginning of Chapter 5.

We chose to modify the chapter to reflect reviewer comments on:

• the characterisation of the World Water Vision process. We re-wrote the box on the World Water Vision process to incorporate widespread criticisms of that process, and to make clear how we viewed the comparison with the WCD;
• the WCD’s award winning web site;
• the section on the media. We deleted large portions that reviewers found irrelevant to the thrust of the study, and replaced them with a more pithy discussion of selected themes;
• the regional consultations. Some reviewers argued that the semi-judicial nature of the consultations undermined the credibility of the WCD with those stakeholder groups who sought a more "hard-nosed" technical appraisal.

We chose not to address a comment that our treatment of the Vietnam consultation was too laudatory. We felt the meeting marked a sufficiently significant departure from past practice to merit comment.

We chose to modify the chapter to reflect reviewer comments on:

• the need for more explicit discussion on the WCD’s failure to release interim findings: its cause, its effect and perceptions of this failure both ex ante and ex post;
• the characterisation of NGOs having more time to spend on advocacy around the WCD. We re-wrote this statement to reflect the greater emphasis and mobilisation of NGOs relative to other groups.

We chose to modify the chapter to reflect reviewer comments on:

• the characterisation of the World Bank’s reaction, particularly on the issue of reparations. We modified this section in response to submissions from the World Bank on their detailed reaction to the report;
• The need for inclusion of Norway’s reaction. This was added to the chapter;
• The need to include some of the negative reactions from civil society. These were added;
• The need to include explicit discussion of the Dams and Development Unit. This was added;
• The need to include reactions by UN agencies. This was added.

We chose not to address:

• reviewer comments that we talk more explicitly about the launch of the report. We felt that we had included sufficient detail for the main target audience;
• More detail on the Dams and Development Unit and the last Forum meeting. This would have been desirable to include, but due to time and length constraints, we added only a brief discussion of these topics. We also felt that a more detailed discussion would have possibly detracted from the main thrust of our task.

We chose to modify the chapter to reflect reviewer comments on:

• The failure to more fully engage the Forum. We increased our emphasis on this point;
• The extent to which a "broad consensus" was possible. We revisited our discussion of the narrow vs. broad consensus, to make more explicit that these were different design choices. We were clearer that an immediate broad consensus was near impossible, and the WCD implicitly assumed that a broad consensus would only follow from post-WCD activities and continued dialogue among stakeholders.

We did not address:

• reviewers’ suggestions that we re-visit the WCD experience in the light of our review of the history of past commissions and MSPs in Chapter 2 to broaden the concluding discussion. This would have been desirable, but we were unable to do so;
• a more explicit discussion of the WCD’s ability to challenge existing power relations as expressed in the dams debate. Again, this would have been a desirable discussion, but we were unable to meet this request;
• More explicit discussion of the conditions that make a debate "ripe" for a WCD-like intervention. This would have required more comparative analysis, which we did not include in our research design.